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Abstract 
We examine the drivers of heterogeneity for the determinants of corporate hedging by applying meta-
regression analysis on a sample of 175 primary studies. Taken all previous findings together, hedgers 
are large, profitable and geographically diversified firms with high capital expenditures and dividend 
payouts, large debt ratios, and low interest coverage. When breaking the effects down across different 
world regions, it becomes apparent that the importance of the hedging determinants varies and not all 
determinants have the same relevance in all geographical areas. Moreover, we find that the type of risk 
exposure, the source of the hedging data, the inclusion of relevant control variables, and the journal 
ranking of the publication outlet explain the variation in previous results. There is also evidence that 
accounting for endogeneity and operational hedging methods are responsible for differences in the 
reported findings. Researchers should be aware of these drivers of heterogeneity when comparing and 
interpreting empirical estimates for the hedging determinants obtained from different data and method 
selections.
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1 Introduction 
The question why non-financial firms engage in corporate hedging ranks among the most intensively 
discussed topics in corporate finance.1 Classical finance theory claims that within a perfect capital 
market, financial hedging is irrelevant to firm value (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). However, more 
recent theories identify situations, in which hedging at the firm-level might be a value-enhancing 
strategy by reducing the costs of cash flow volatility arising from financial distress and bankruptcy, 
taxes, costly external financing, asymmetric information and agency conflicts (Bessembinder, 1991; 
DeMarzo and Duffie, 1991; Froot et al., 1993; Smith and Stulz, 1985). When it comes to the empirical 
investigation of the hedging theories, findings are rather mixed and do not allow any final conclusions, 
as emphasized in previous literature: 
“As a whole, the findings of empirical studies [on corporate hedging] remain controversial 
because conclusions are largely sample specific.“ (Bartram et al., 2009, p. 185) 
“While the empirical studies are informative, they provide conflicting evidence as to which class 
of determinant is driving corporate derivatives usage.“ (Howton and Perfect, 1998, p. 53) 
“There is inconsistency in the risk management literature regarding the extent to which firms 
use financial derivatives.“ (Treanor et al., 2013, p. 64) 
In summary, previous authors suggest that the lack of robust results in the empirical hedging literature 
might be explained by the fact that existing studies widely differ in terms of their data sources (e.g., time 
period or type of risk exposure under examination), estimation techniques (e.g., inclusion of industry 
fixed effects or accounting for endogeneity), model specifications (e.g., inclusion of certain control 
variables), and study quality (some studies are published in prestigious peer-reviewed journals, others 
are unpublished working papers or doctoral theses). In addition, a recent strand of the literature puts 
forward that country-specific conditions and regional differences, such as the cultural environment, are 
important factors when searching for differences in the hedging behavior of non-financial firms 
(Bartram et al., 2009; Lel, 2012; Lievenbrück and Schmid, 2014). In summary, each of these factors 
might affect the reported results ending in a great diversity of possible explanations for the ambiguous 
empirical evidence. 
In this study, we apply meta-regression analysis (MRA) to explain the heterogeneity in existing 
                                                     
1 Early studies on the determinants of corporate hedging policy are Francis and Stephan (1990), Nance et al. (1993), or Smith and Stulz (1985). 
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empirical results. MRA is a statistical tool to model the effect of any aspect of study design for which 
information is available, to identify its impact on the reported results, and to correct for distorting effects 
through publication selection bias and model misspecification (Stanley, 2001). To apply MRA, we build 
on a sample of 7,024 manually collected estimates from 175 empirical primary studies2 and analyze the 
impact of the fourteen most frequently examined hedging determinants, while accounting for 
geographical heterogeneity and differences in the data and methodological set up of the studies. 
Thereby, we contribute to the literature in several ways: (i) We present a quantitative summary of the 
complete body of empirical estimates on the determinants for both the decision to hedge and the extent 
of hedging, (ii) we analyze whether previous literature suffers from selective reporting of statistically 
significant results (publication selection bias) and report mean effects of the hedging determinants 
corrected for this bias, and (iii) we quantify the impact of a broad set of observable differences in study 
design on the reported empirical estimates. Through this analysis, we empirically address some 
intensively discussed issues in the literature, such as the impact of the type of risk exposure on the 
hedging behavior, differences between the decision to engage in corporate hedging and the extent of 
hedging, the effect of econometric challenges (such as the endogeneity of corporate financial decisions), 
as well as the influence of country-level factors. 
The remainder of this study is outlined as follows. Section 2 contains the theoretical foundations and 
a review of the related literature. Section 3 describes the MRA methodology. Section 4 presents the 
construction of the sample of primary studies and the data preparation. Section 5 includes the selection 
of explanatory variables, which are assumed to affect the variation in previous research results. Section 
6 presents the meta-analytical results, which are discussed in Section 7. Section 8 concludes. An online 
supplement provides additional materials and robustness tests.3 
2 Hedging theories and related literature 
According to Modigliani and Miller (1958), risk management activities do not contribute to firm value, 
as shareholders can effectively hedge risk on a private level.4 Indeed, this proposition relies on the 
assumption of a perfect capital market. By incorporating market imperfections, scholars developed two 
                                                     
2 Within this paper, we use the term primary studies to refer to the original empirical studies collected for synthesis in the meta-analysis. 
3 The supplement can be downloaded from the IRFA journal website or from https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.17071.79527/1. 
4 MacMinn (1987) shows that the irrelevance theorem by Modigliani and Miller (1958) is also valid for corporate risk management policy. 
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lines of theories serving as explanation why non-financial firms engage in corporate hedging. The 
shareholder value maximization hypothesis proposes that firms hedge to increase firm value by lowering 
costs associated with cash flow volatility. These costs could result from financial distress, expensive 
external financing and underinvestment, greater tax payments, or expenses to mitigate information 
asymmetries between shareholders and managers (DeMarzo and Duffie, 1991; Froot et al., 1993; Smith 
and Stulz, 1985). In contrast, the managerial utility maximization hypothesis sees hedging to be 
motivated by managers’ personal interests arising from the willingness to reduce their private risk 
exposure or to signal managerial abilities to the labor market (DeMarzo and Duffie, 1995; Smith and 
Stulz, 1985). Apart from the two main hedging hypotheses, empirical research has identified a number 
of other firm characteristics which are supposed to impact costs and benefits of corporate hedging, for 
example, the existence of hedging substitutes, the level of a firm’s risk exposure, economies of scale in 
the hedging costs, or country-level differences (Allayannis et al., 2001; Géczy et al., 1997; Nance et al., 
1993).5 A detailed description of the various hedging theories is available in the online supplement S1. 
To model the theoretical hedging arguments, empirical studies define various proxy variables 
representing the hedging determinants. For example, the corporate debt ratio can be seen as a proxy for 
the level of financial distress. The general econometric model to test the impact of the determinants on 
a firm’s hedging behavior can be formularized as follows:  
𝐻𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 , (1) 
where 𝑖 and 𝑡 are firm and time subscripts; 𝐻 is a measure of corporate hedging activities; 𝑋 is a vector 
of the study-specific hedging determinants; 𝑍 represents a vector of control variables where previous 
studies have shown that they are important determinants of corporate hedging (e.g., firm size); 𝜂𝑖 and 
𝛿𝑡 capture firm-specific and time-specific effects. The vector of regression coefficients 𝛽 measures the 
strength and direction of the relation between the proxies and the hedging variable. In the subsequent 
MRA, this effect will be aggregated across primary studies. 
Regarding the dependent variable 𝐻, studies examine two dimensions of corporate hedging: the initial 
decision to set up a hedging program and the extent to which a company hedges its exposure (Dolde and 
                                                     
5 Further incentives for corporate hedging are, among others, behavioral biases like managerial overconfidence (Adam et al., 2015), accruals 
management (Pincus and Rajgopal, 2002), or the existence of bond covenants (Beatty et al., 2012). However, these aspects are only discussed 
by a small number of studies and, so far, cannot be appropriately examined by MRA. 
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Mishra, 2007). We refer to these two levels as the decision to hedge and the extent of hedging. Studies 
investigating the decision to hedge typically use a Logit or Probit estimation with a binary variable to 
assign firms either to a group of hedgers or a group of non-hedgers (e.g., Nance et al., 1993). In contrast, 
the extent of hedging can be modeled by a continuous variable like the net notional amount of 
outstanding derivatives contracts (e.g., Graham and Rogers, 2002) or the percentage of the underlying 
exposure that is hedged (e.g., Carter et al., 2006). 
Given the large body of literature and the inconclusive results of empirical primary studies on the 
determinants of corporate hedging, it is not surprising that the literature already provides consolidations 
of the empirical evidence.6 Aretz and Bartram (2010) use a vote counting method and compare the 
number of statistically significant results for and against each hedging determinant with each other. 
However, their approach does not consider differences in study design. Hence, they implicitly assume 
that the studies included in their sample are homogenous and as such are directly comparable. Arnold 
et al. (2014) apply meta-analysis methods from medical research to calculate weighted averages of the 
standardized mean differences between the groups of hedging and non-hedging firms for 15 different 
hedging determinants. Geyer-Klingeberg et al. (2018b) extend this approach and additionally consider 
the multidimensional nature of the motives behind corporate derivatives usage by aggregating the 
Pearson correlation coefficients reported in the primary studies and incorporating the dependency 
structure among the hedging determinants using multivariate meta-analysis. For both studies, the overall 
conclusions about the importance of the hedging theories are fairly similar (see online supplement S2). 
Nevertheless, there are several weaknesses observable from the existing meta-analyses: (i) Both reviews 
primarily focus on the estimation of aggregated proxy variables. Thus, they give an answer to the 
question what is the average effect between a set of proxy variables and the corporate hedging decision. 
In contrast, the MRA approach applied in this study explicitly models the heterogeneity among previous 
publications, thereby providing evidence why individual studies reach different conclusions. (ii) Another 
issue is that both meta-analyses use effect sizes7 estimated from the univariate results reported in the 
primary studies. However, relations might be driven by the interrelations among the hedging 
                                                     
6 A summary of the findings presented in the previous reviews is presented in the online supplement S2. 
7 We refer to the term ‘effect size’ as any statistical measure defining the magnitude and direction of the relationship between two variables 
(Borenstein et al., 2009). These are the measures to be aggregated in a meta-analysis. 
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determinants and other control variables as indicated by the vectors 𝑋 and 𝑍 in Eq. (1).8 In this study, 
we directly collect estimates from the regression analysis sections of the primary studies. Thus, the 
derived effect sizes measure the partial relationship between the hedging variable and the hedging 
determinant, while holding the other variables constant. (iii) Previous reviews focus on results for the 
decision to hedge. However, literature shows that beyond the decision to engage in hedging, also the 
extent of hedging is an important aspect of the corporate risk management policy (Allayannis and Ofek, 
2001; Haushalter, 2000). We extend this by analyzing both the decision to hedge and the hedging extent. 
3 The meta-analysis data set 
3.1 Search strategy 
Before collecting the sample of primary studies, certain criteria must be defined to decide which of the 
identified papers should be included in the final database. This step is necessary to ensure that the 
collected estimates are comparable within and between studies, in such a way that differences can be 
coded by the inclusion of the meta-regression variables. 
Firm type. Only studies investigating non-financial companies are included because risk management 
incentives of firms from the financial sector are usually quite different compared to other industrial 
companies (Gay and Nam, 1998; Knopf et al., 2002; Purnanandam, 2008). 
Design of empirical analysis. Studies must report results from regression analysis as formularized in 
Eq. (1). The dependent variable should measure corporate hedging by a dummy or continuous variable 
that captures financial derivatives usage or a mix of derivatives and other hedging methods (like foreign 
debt or operational hedging). To ensure comparability of the results, samples excluding derivatives users 
from the hedging variable will not be considered. Moreover, we exclude estimates where the dependent 
variable measures selective hedging9, because the results cannot be pooled in a sample with other studies 
examining risk reduction as the primary goal of corporate hedging. 
Reported results. Studies must provide the statistical information required for MRA. This includes 
regression coefficients, sample sizes, and a precision measure of the regression estimates (such as 
                                                     
8 Geyer-Klingeberg et al. (2018b) partly address this issue by modelling the dependency structure among the hedging determinants in their 
meta-analysis model. 
9 Managers may have incentives to actively time derivatives transactions based on their market view, a practice called market timing or selective 
hedging (Adam et al., 2017; Brown et al., 2006). Indeed, the sample of studies on selective hedging is too small to conduct a second MRA. 
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standard errors, t-statistics, or p-values). 
Non-identical samples. Estimates from two or more studies using the same or largely overlapping data 
sets (regarding country and time span) are only included if the authors or analyses vary. 
Publication outlet. Studies can either be articles published in referred journals or unpublished 
manuscripts and conference papers. The latter group of studies is also referred to as ‘grey literature’. 
Including unpublished work is preferable as it captures recent studies that are not published yet and, 
moreover, increases the number of observations. In addition, our sample includes estimates from studies 
published in journals of different quality. Focusing only on top journals would lead to a significantly 
smaller data set and a reduction of variation of the MRA variables. As even biased and misspecified 
results bear useful information that should be incorporated in a meta-analysis (Stanley and 
Doucouliagos, 2012), we include all papers and explicitly control for study quality and other study 
characteristics in the meta-regression model. 
For the literature search, we started with the sample of primary studies cited in the review by Aretz 
and Bartram (2010). Based on this initial selection, a search command was designed by linking terms 
that are often used in the titles, keywords, and abstracts of these studies.10 Using this search query, the 
following major electronic databases were screened: ABI/Inform Complete, Business Source Premier, 
EconLit, Google Scholar, Scopus, and Social Science Research Network. To find studies not containing 
the required keywords, a ‘snowballing’ technique was conducted after the database search. This strategy 
involves a backward-tracking of the reference sections in the papers and a forward-tracking of each 
study’s citations in Google Scholar. In the next step, we read the selected studies in detail and filtered 
the sample against the selection criteria. The final sample contains 175 primary studies. The full 
reference list is reported in the online supplement S3 (with more details of each study described in S4). 
3.2 Hedging determinants 
Literature investigates a wide range of hedging determinants captured by the vectors 𝑋 and 𝑍 in Eq. 
(1). For instance, Aretz and Bartram (2010) identify 54 different variables in their review of the hedging 
literature. As a minimum number of observations is necessary to appropriately conduct MRA, only the 
                                                     
10 The search command consists of keywords linked by Boolean operators with the following logic: (i) terms relating to corporate hedging 
(hedg* or derivative*), (ii) terms relating to non-financial companies (firm* or corporat*, non-financial, company), and (iii) terms relating to 
methodology (empiric*, data, sample, analy*, evidence, investigat*, relation*, impact). 
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most commonly examined hedging determinants are selected for synthesis. In their review of 140 meta-
analyses, Nelson and Kennedy (2009) report that the median number of observations is 92. We use this 
number as a threshold that each hedging determinant must exceed to be included in the sample. After 
scanning the sample of 175 primary studies and counting the number of observations for each variable, 
a set of fourteen proxies is left.11  Unfortunately, this procedure left no proxy for the asymmetric 
information and agency conflicts of equity and bondholders hypotheses.  
Tab. 3 describes the set of selected hedging determinants that will be analyzed in the meta-regression 
analysis. The variable definitions are derived from the primary studies and are not unique since authors 
use a wide range of operationalizations (indicated by the optional elements or alternative definitions 
shown in parentheses). Furthermore, Tab. 1 assigns each determinant to the corresponding hedging 
theory. It also shows the hypothesized sign of the impact of the respective determinant on the hedging 
variable 𝐻 from Eq. (1). A detailed description of each determinant and its impact on corporate hedging 
behavior is outlined in the online supplement S5. 
<<< INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE >>> 
4 Methodology 
Meta-regression analysis is ‘the regression analysis of regression analyses’ (Stanley and Jarrell, 1989). 
Accordingly, the effect sizes to be aggregated are observational estimates from regression models. The 
general objective of MRA is two-fold: (i) Synthesize effect sizes from a set of primary studies within a 
single summary effect, and (ii) explain the heterogeneity among these effect sizes by identifying study 
characteristics that are associated with this variation. By pooling estimates across many studies, meta-
analysis minimizes estimation error and allows inferences without depending on specific sample 
characteristics. Whereas results of any primary study are subject to its specific research design, MRA 
can objectively control for any study-specific aspect, such as the estimation technique, model 
specification, variable definitions, and other author-specific dimensions that might have an impact on 
the heterogeneous findings. Moreover, MRA adds value as it explicitly models the impact of ‘study-
invariant’ factors, i.e. aspects that are constant within a study but vary across studies, such as publication 
status, number of citations, or the country under examination (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012). 
                                                     
11 In total, the number of observations for 96 different proxy variables was collected in this step. 
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Due to its distinctive features, MRA has become a common method for research synthesis in 
economics research (see, e.g., Bellavance et al., 2009; Card et al., 2010; Havranek and Irsova, 2011). 
Existing applications in financial economics include the explanation of the heterogeneous results of the 
marginal tax effect on the corporate debt ratio (Feld et al., 2013), the market equity premium (van Ewijk 
et al., 2012), the efficient market hypothesis (Geyer-Klingeberg et al., 2018c; Kim et al., 2014), the 
determinants of corporate cash holdings (Weidemann, 2016), dividend smoothing (Fernau and Hirsch, 
2017), the firm value effects of hedging (Geyer-Klingeberg et al., 2018a), and the determinants of 
corporate capital structure (Hang et al., 2018a, b). 
4.1 Choice of effect size 
The main criterion for the selection of the effect size is that the estimates must be comparable within 
and across studies (Stanley and Jarrell, 1989). In this paper, the measure to be aggregated is the 
regression coefficient 𝛽 from Eq. (1). It captures the strength and direction of the effect of each hedging 
determinant on either the hedging decision or the extent of hedging. As obervable from Tab. 1, studies 
differ in the way they operationalize the proxy variables. Accordingly, the interpretation of the raw 
regression coefficient 𝛽 heavily depends on the definition of the variables and the other controls being 
included. Thus, they are not directly comparable across studies. To account for measurement 
differences, we follow a common procedure in meta-analysis research and transform the reported effects 
into partial correlation cofficients (among many others, Doucouliagos et al., 2012; Valickova et al., 
2015; Zigraiova and Havranek, 2016). The partial correlation 𝑟 is a unitless measure for the strength 
and direction of the effect between two variables, while holding other factors constant (Stanley and 
Doucouliagos, 2012). The partial correlation coefficient and the corresponding standard errors can be 










where 𝑖 is the subscript for the estimate (𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑚); 𝑗 is the subscript for the study (𝑗 = 1, … , 175); 
𝑡  is the 𝑡 -statistic of the regression coefficient reported in the primary study; and 𝑑𝑓  denotes the 
corresponding degrees of freedom. The effect sizes are calculated separately for each hedging 
determinant (𝑘 = 1, … , 14). 
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The data required for the calculation of the partial correlations is not directly reported in each study. 
For example, the degrees of freedom are rarely found in the primary studies. Thus, we inferred them 
from the number of observations and the number of independent variables included.12 If t-ratios are not 
available, we derived them from the reported p-values and the degrees of freedom.  
4.2 The basic MRA model 
An important challenge for every meta-analysis arises from publication selection bias, which appears 
when researchers and journals neglect results that are either statistically insignificant or inconsistent 
with theoretical predictions (Begg and Berlin, 1988; Card and Krueger, 1995; Rosenthal, 1979). Without 
such a preference for certain outcomes, the partial correlation coefficients should be randomly 
distributed around the true effect of the hedging determinants. However, discarding insignificant 
findings or estimates with unexpected signs leads to correlation between the reported estimates and their 
standard errors (Havranek and Irsova, 2011).13 Such a correlation occurs if, for example, authors of 
studies with small sample sizes change their model specification until they find estimates to be large 
enough to offset high standard errors (Stanley et al., 2008). The statistical test for the presence and 
correction of publication selection bias is given by (Stanley, 2005): 
𝑟𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐸(𝑟𝑖𝑗) + 𝑖𝑗,    𝑖𝑗 ∼ 𝑁(0; 𝑆𝐸(𝑟𝑖𝑗)
2), (3) 
where 𝑖  and 𝑗  are estimate and study subscripts; 𝑟  is the partial correlation coefficient between the 
respective hedging determinant and the dependent hedging variable; 𝑆𝐸(𝑟) is the standard error of the 
partial correlation;  is the error term. This model is estimated separately for each hedging determinant 
(𝑘 = 1, … , 14). According to Egger et al. (1997), the rejection of the null hypothesis, H0: 𝛽1 = 0, tests 
the presence of publication selection bias. The corresponding regression parameter ?̂?1 measures the 
direction and magnitude of the bias. The estimate for the intercept, ?̂?0, is the mean partial correlation 
assuming that 𝑆𝐸(𝑟) is close to zero (𝑆𝐸(𝑟) → 0, 𝐸(𝑟) → ?̂?0 ). Thus, rejecting the null hypothesis, H0: 
𝛽0 = 0, is a test for the existence of a genuine effect beyond publication selection bias (Stanley, 2008). 
Here, it should be noted that simulation studies have shown that using a non-linear term by replacing 
                                                     
12 For fixed effects models, the number of year/time/country dummies is considered as well. 
13 Begg and Berlin (1988) show that when researchers favor statistically significant results, publication selection bias is proportional to the 
inverse of the square root of the sample size, which itself is proportional to the standard error.   
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𝑆𝐸(𝑟) with 𝑆𝐸(𝑟)2  yields a better correction for publication selection (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 
2014). Hence, we will use ?̂?1 to detect publication selection bias and calculate the corrected mean effect 
?̂?0 from a model with squared standard error. 
4.3 The augmented MRA model 
The basic MRA model (Eq. 3) assumes that all studies estimate the same population effect and thus 
the variation of the partial correlations occurs from sampling error. However, the reported estimates 
probably depend on various aspects of study design causing excess heterogeneity beyond sampling 
error. As in any other regression model, omitting important factors that are supposed to have an impact 
on the dependent variable may end up in biased estimates for the MRA coefficients (Efendic et al., 
2011). To accommodate omitted-variable bias, the augmented MRA explicitly models the impact of 
heterogeneity by including a set of explanatory variables that are suspected to be in charge of the large 
variation in the reported results (Stanley et al., 2008):  
𝑟𝑖𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐸(𝑟𝑖𝑗) + ∑ 𝛾𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑙
𝐿
𝑙=1 + 𝑖𝑗,    𝑖𝑗 ∼ 𝑁(0; 𝑆𝐸(𝑟𝑖𝑗)
2), (4) 
where 𝑌 denotes a set of variables capturing heterogeneity in the partial correlations; other variables and 
subscripts are the same as in Eq. (3). ?̂?1 is still a measure for publication selection bias. The intercept 
?̂?0 again represents the mean partial correlation corrected for publication selection, but now must be 
interpreted conditional on 𝒀 = 0. The MRA coefficients 𝛾  reflect the effect of the particular study 
characteristic on the effect sizes. Accordingly, the explanatory variables can be interpreted as 
moderators for the relationship between the hedging determinants and the dependent hedging variable 
measured by the partial correlation coefficient (Borenstein et al., 2009). 
<<< INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE >>> 
4.4 MRA model specification 
Due to several econometric issues, the MRA models described in Eqs. (3) and (4) are rarely estimated 
in the form presented above. 
Heteroscedasticity. The variance of the effect sizes depends on the sample size of the primary studies. 
As they are largely different, this leads to a non-constant variance of the error terms (heteroscedasticity). 
To address heteroscedasticity problems, all estimations are carried out by weighted least squares (WLS) 
using the inverse of the squared standard errors as weights (Stanley, 2005, 2008). The WLS approach 
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also accounts for quality issues as studies reporting low standard errors and thus more precise results 
receive larger weights in the estimation.  
Within-study dependencies. The studies in our sample regularly report multiple estimates for different 
model specifications, robustness tests, or subsamples. Sampling just one estimate (e.g., the most 
preferable) from each study would end in a great reduction of observations, as well as a loss of 
information, that is indeed necessary to explore the various sources of heterogeneity (Stanley and 
Doucouliagos, 2012). Moreover, choosing one specific estimate requires objective selection criteria 
which are hard to justify and thus may introduce subjective selection bias. Hence, we follow a best 
practice in meta-analysis research and sample all available estimates (among others, Feld et al., 2013; 
Kysucky and Norden, 2016; Rusnak et al., 2013). However, this approach bears the risk of within-study 
dependencies, which entails a violation of the assumption that the error terms in the Eqs. (3) and (4) are 
independently and identically distributed (Greene, 2011). To accommodate the issue of correlated effect 
sizes, the models are estimated with robust errors clustered at the study-level. This is a commonly 
applied remedy for within-study dependency in MRA research (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012). 
Between-study dependencies. Besides correlation within studies, effect sizes could also be related 
across studies when different authors use similar data sets (e.g., US studies commonly examine S&P 
500 firms). To consider such dependencies, standard errors in the MRA model are additionally clustered 
at the country-level using two-way clustering (Havranek and Irsova, 2017). 
5 Description of meta-regression variables 
There are two groups of heterogeneity (Havranek and Irsova, 2011; Rusnak et al., 2013). The first 
group covers real differences among the estimates reported in the primary studies (structural 
heterogeneity). Moreover, estimates might vary due to the employed methodology and specific study 
design (methodological heterogeneity). We collect several variables (denoted as Y vector in Eq. (4)) to 
quantify the impact of both types of heterogeneity. The selection of the variables is driven by data 
availability from the primary studies and discussions in the literature.14 All variables are manually coded 
by reading the articles. See Tab. 2 and 3 for an overview of the selected variables and their definitions. 
                                                     
14 Originally, we collected > 50 variables, but had to exclude several variables due to insufficient variation in the data or collinearity problems. 
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5.1 Structural heterogeneity 
We cluster the countries examined in the primary studies into four geographical areas (East Asia & 
Pacific, Europe, North America, and the Rest of the World).15 A further group named Global includes 
studies examining data from more than one region. Regarding the coverage of different industries, two 
groups of studies can be identified. The first category’s focus is exclusively on one specific industry and 
the examined firms are often homogenous as they operate in a similar business environment. The second 
group examines firms from multiple industries, usually with strong differences in the underlying risk 
exposures (Davies et al., 2006). The inclusion of multiple industries increases the cross-sectional 
variation in the data, which could support the identification of differences in corporate hedging practices. 
To capture dissimilarities between single and multi-industry samples, a dummy (Single industry) is 
introduced that is equal to one for single-industry studies.  
<<< INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE >>> 
5.2 Methodological heterogeneity 
Variables explaining methodological heterogeneity can be divided into four groups: differences in the 
dependent (hedging) variable, data characteristics to control for differences in the underlying data sets, 
estimation characteristics to incorporate differences in the applied econometric techniques, specification 
characteristics to account for differences in the model setup, and publication characteristics to consider 
differences in study quality not captured by the other variables.  
<<< INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE >>> 
Differences in the hedging measure. Risk reduction can be obtained by different financial and 
operational strategies. Thus, equating hedgers with derivatives users bears the risk of incorrectly 
defining firms without derivative holdings as non-hedging firms, although they just employ alternative 
strategies for risk reduction (Guay and Kothari, 2003). We code a dummy variable Operational hedging 
included that is equal to one for studies considering operational strategies in their hedging definition.16 
The question whether firms engage in derivatives usage for risk reduction or to benefit from market 
timing poses a further issue (Adam et al., 2017; Brown et al., 2006). The dummy variable Risk reduction 
                                                     
15 The geographical regions are classified by the World Bank’s Country and Lending Groups scheme (World Bank, 2016). 
16 Due to the low number of studies with a hedging definition beyond derivatives usage, this variable can only be included in the analysis of 
the decision to hedge. 
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only is added to control for studies that exclude firms with derivatives holdings for selective or trading 
purposes. However, this might be a ‘noisy’ proxy as many studies are assigned to the base category (no 
correction for selective hedging), whereas this does not necessarily mean that their samples contain 
selective hedgers. Although unreported, the firms included in their samples might use derivatives only 
for risk reduction. As firm-level data is required to construct a better measure for the presence of 
selective hedgers in the primary studies, we use the proxy as described while taking into account its 
noisy character when interpreting the results. Moreover, we include three variables capturing whether a 
reported result explicitly refers to hedging of foreign exchange risk, interest rate risk, or commodity 
price risk. A further variable forms the base category and covers studies examining a mix of several 
exposures. Among the continuous hedging variables, the gross notional amount defined as the sum of 
all outstanding derivatives contracts independent of the exact position (long or short) is the most 
commonly used hedging variable. As notional amounts might overestimate the hedging levels, they are 
often seen as a biased measure for hedging (Judge, 2007). As alternative, some studies use net notional 
amounts or the actual hedge ratio, which indicates the percentage of the underlying risk exposure that is 
being hedged. Indeed, both measures require additional data that is often unvailable. The dummy 
Alternative hedging measure is constructed for estimates where the dependent hedging variable is not 
the total notional amount.  
Data characteristics. If a firm is a non-hedger, this might either be driven by its explicit decision 
against hedging or the absence of a risk exposure. To avoid biased inferences, various authors suggest 
that the group of firms without ex ante exposure should be excluded from the data (Davies et al., 2006; 
Géczy et al., 1997; Graham and Rogers, 2002). We add the dummy variable Ex ante exposure indicating 
studies which follow this recommendation. Moreover, the average year of the time period covered by a 
primary study’s data set is included to measure structural changes in the effects of the hedging 
determinants. Another dummy (Panel data) distinguishes between studies using panel data as opposed 
to cross-sectional data. Due to the lack of hedging data available from annual reports, early studies make 
use of survey data, often with a low number of questionnaires sent back to the authors, which may cause 
a non-response bias in the data.17 To account for differences between data from surveys compared to 
                                                     
17 For example, the response rate is 27.9 % in Aabo et al. (2010), 10.3 % in Kim and Sung (2005), or 31.6 % in Nance et al. (1993). 
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data collected from annual reports or databases, the dummy variable Survey data is considered for 
studies observing hedging data from surveys. 
Estimation characteristics. In addition to the standard control variables used in the hedging models (𝑍 
vector in Eq. 1), corporate hedging behavior might also be correlated with unobservable firm-, time-, 
and country-specific factors. A dummy variable (Fixed effects) is included that identifies studies 
considering fixed effects in their estimation. Furthermore, a major threat for the validity of empirical 
studies linking certain firm characteristics to corporate hedging arises from endogenous relations among 
the included hedging determinants and the error term. Endogeneity can be the result of the omission of 
relevant but unobservable variables (covered by the Fixed effects dummy above). Another source of 
endogeneity originates from the fact that financial decisions are often made simultaneously. More recent 
studies apply instrumental variable estimation to explicitly model the endogenous relations between a 
firm’s hedging policy and its capital structure (among others, Bartram et al., 2009; Gay et al., 2011; 
Graham and Rogers, 2002), hedging and growth opportunities (Choi et al., 2013), hedging and liquidity 
choices (Disatnik et al., 2014), hedging and management compensation (Bakke et al., 2016), or hedging 
and payout flexibility (Bonaime et al., 2014). We include a dummy variable (Endogeneity) for studies 
that explicitly address endogeneity by instrumental variable models or lagged values of the hedging 
determinants. Moreover, studies analyzing the impact of the hedging determinants on the decision to 
hedge commonly apply Logit or Probit models. To find out whether the model choice affects the 
reported results, a dummy (Logit) denotes if an estimate comes from a Logit model. When examining 
the extent of hedging, the dependent variable usually has positive values for hedgers and zero values for 
non-hedgers (censored data). In this case, the standard OLS estimator is inconsistent. Thus, primary 
studies usually apply a Tobit or censored regression (Tobin, 1958). A weakness of this procedure lies in 
its assumption that the decision to hedge and the extent of hedging are both affected by the same 
variables (Goldberg et al., 1998). However, previous literature has shown that the determinants for the 
two levels of hedging decisions are not necessarily identical (Adam, 2002; Gay et al., 2011; Haushalter, 
2001). A statistical solution for this problem is given by the Cragg model (Cragg, 1971) and the two-
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step Heckman regression (Heckman, 1979).18 A dummy variable (Cragg) is coded that is equal to one 
if an estimate is observed from a model that accounts for censored data. 
Specification characteristics. Most of the studies in our sample include standard controls for firm size 
(98 %), hedging substitutes (97 %), capital structure (91 %), or growth opportunities (90 %). In contrast, 
variables for other hedging theories are less frequently considered. To measure potential 
misspecification bias through the omission of these variables, three dummies are coded indicating 
whether a model contains proxies for a firm’s risk exposure (Control EXP), the asymmetric information 
hypothesis (Control ASI), or the managerial risk aversion hypothesis (Control MAV). Furthermore, two 
other dummies indicate the presence of variables representing hedging methods different from 
derivatives usage, namely other financial hedging instruments (Control OFH) and geographical 
diversification (Control GDF). 
Publication characteristics. To account for quality differences in the studies not captured by the other 
variables, a dummy (Top journal) marks if estimates are observed from one of the most influential 
journals in the area of financial economics, accounting, or business research. A journal is assigned to 
this group if its impact factor reported by the Scimago Journal Ranking19 exceeds 1. 
6 Empirical results 
6.1 Descriptive statistics 
Tab. 4 provides summary statistics for the MRA variables.20  
<<< INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE >>> 
The regional distribution of the collected estimates reveals a dominance of North American studies in 
the corporate hedging literature. Nevertheless, more than half of the observations in the full sample is 
based on data from other geographical regions. Regarding the distribution of the risk exposures, most 
studies focus on multiple sources of financial risk (38.1 % in Panel C). About one third of the estimates 
in the full sample refers to hedgers of FX exposures, which is regularly documented to be the most 
important source of risk in multi-industry studies (Bartram et al., 2009). The total number of articles 
                                                     
18 Both approaches start with a model for the decision to hedge and in the second stage estimate the extent of hedging conditional on the results 
from the first-stage model. 
19 https://www.scimagojr.com/ 
20 In addition, the online supplement presents descriptive statistics of the partial correlations (online supplement S6 and S7). 
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correcting for endogeneity bias in the determinants of hedging is still low, representing just 4.2% of the 
full sample size. Aretz and Bartram (2010) explain this observation by the difficulties occurring in the 
application of statistical methods that account for endogenous relations (e.g. the identification of 
appropriate instruments). 
6.2 Analysis of publication selection bias and true effect beyond 
Tab. 5 reports the results for the basic MRA model (Eq. (3)). The slope coefficient ?̂?1 measures the 
presence and magnitude of publication selection bias. The intercept ?̂?0 is an estimate for the mean effect 
beyond publication selection bias. For its calculation, 𝑆𝐸(𝑟𝑖𝑗) is replaced by 𝑆𝐸(𝑟𝑖𝑗)
2 in Eq. (3), which 
has been shown to yield better correction for publication selection (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2014). 
The reported t-statistics are based on robust errors, clustered at the study-level and country-level to 
account for dependencies among estimates taken from the same study or similar data sets. 
<<< INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE >>> 
Overall, the results for Panel A reveal that, compared to non-hedging firms, hedgers are large, 
profitable and geographically diversified firms with high capital expenditures and dividend payouts, 
large debt ratios and low interest coverage. The mean effects for these variables are all statistically 
significant (at least at the 1 % level). Despite of profitability (PRO), all significant variables have the 
sign predicted by theory. The positive relation between PRO and the decision to hedge might be 
explained by the cost argument. Accordingly, more profitable firms have more financial resources 
available to set up a fixed costs-intensive hedging program. Regarding the two determinants with 
theoretical predictions in both directions (FSZ and GDF), the positive sign for firm size provides 
evidence that economies of scale are highly relevant for hedging firms. The positive impact of the degree 
of geographical diversification is in line with the exposure argument and contradicts the prediction that 
operational hedging is a substitute for financial hedging. 
Regarding the size of the mean effects, the most important hedging determinants for the decision to 
hedge are the degree of geographical diversification, firm size, and the amount of foreign sales. All three 
variables show mean partial correlations between 0.10 and 0.14, which is multiple times above the 
values of the other proxies. Additionally, the estimates for DRA and ICR support the theory that hedging 
is employed to reduce financial distress costs. Moreover, DRA and DIY indicate that interactions with 
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other financial decisions are important for a firm’s hedging policy. However, these results are difficult 
to interpret as they might be contaminated by endogeneity problems. 
The results for the bias coefficients ?̂?1  detect publication selection bias for five of the fourteen 
variables. For the interpretation of the magnitude of the bias, we follow the guidance by Doucouliagos 
and Stanley (2013).21 Using this classification, substantial bias can be confirmed for FSA, FSZ, RAD, 
and SOS. In the case of GDF, the bias is even severe. 
The results for Panel B uncover that five of the variables that are determinants of the decision to hedge 
also play a relevant role when deciding about the extent of hedging (CPX, DRA, FSZ, ICR, and PRO). 
However, the size of the coefficients is somewhat smaller compared to Panel A, except for ICR, where 
the effect is about four times larger. Furthermore, the sign of PRO coincides with the theoretical 
prediction that more profitable firms have lower hedge volumes as they are less likely to face financial 
distress. Moreover, the mean partial correlations for MTB and OOS turn out to be statistically 
significant, even though both have reverse signs as compared to theory. One explanation for this finding 
might be that both variables are no ideal measures for the underlying theories. For MTB, theory proposes 
that underinvestment is a threat for firms with growth options and high leverage. Although MTB is a 
proxy for growth opportunities, it does not say much about the corporate debt level. An explanation for 
the direction of the OOS variable is given by Gay and Nam (1998), who argue that firms often replace 
out-of-the-money options by new options with strike prices equal to the current stock price. In this case, 
option payoff provides incentives similar to common shares. Regarding the size of the mean effects, 
three determinants turn out to be the key factors for the extent of hedging: FSZ, ICR, and OOS. 
Tab. 6 presents the results from the same model featured in Tab. 5, but now separately for the 
geographical regions. The number of estimates for some of the clusters is rather low or even zero. To 
avoid biased inferences from small samples, only those estimates are reported where the number of 
observations is at least 15.22 Standard errors are only clustered at study-level. 
<<< INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE >>> 
 
                                                     
21 The strength of publication selection bias is classified as ‘little to modest’ if the bias coefficient is stat. insignificant or |?̂?1| < 1; ‘substantial’ 
if the coefficient is stat. significant and 1 ≤ |?̂?1| ≤ 2; and ‘severe’ if the coefficient is stat. significant and |?̂?1| > 2. 
22 This threshold might be arbitrary, but most of the results from estimations with less than 15 observations show extremely inflated t-statistics. 
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There are three groups of findings: (i) Determinants with the same sign and strong statistical 
significance across all regions, (ii) determinants with mixed signs and/or mixed statistical significance 
across the regions, and (iii) determinants with overall weak support across all regions. 
FSA, FSZ, and GDF show positive and highly significant effects for all regional subsamples, 
independent of whether they measure the impact on the decision to hedge (Panel A) or the extent of 
hedging (Panel B). Nevertheless, there are some meaningful differences in the size of the effects. For 
example, the corrected mean partial correlation for FSA in the East Asia & Pacific region is 0.248 
(Panel B), which is more than twice as high compared to the effect of 0.094 identified for North 
American firms. This finding might be explained by the high proportion of companies from Australia 
and New Zealand in the East Asia & Pacific group. The examined firms from these countries (mostly 
companies from the natural resources sector) are usually characterized by high export ratios and thus 
might be more sensitive to exchange rate swings. In a similar vein, firm size seems to be a less important 
factor for North American firms when determining their hedge volume (0.119 in Panel A and 0.043 in 
Panel B). This observation might arise from the high liquidity of the US derivatives market and the 
access to a broad range of financial hedging instruments even for smaller firms. Another finding to be 
emphasized is that the effect for GDF indicates that operational strategies quantified by the degree of 
geographical diversification act as a complement rather than a substitute for hedging. One reason for 
this could be that firms employ operational hedging to protect themselves against long-term risks, while 
financial hedges commonly refer to shorter time horizons (Triantis, 2000). 
The second group of results covers CPX, DIY, DRA, ICR, LIQ, MTB, OOS, and PRO. One 
implication from the estimates for these variables might be that the interplay between corporate hedging 
policy and other financial decisions measured by DIY and DRA is an important factor for the decision 
to hedge, but less important for the actual hedging volume. This conclusion stems from the fact that the 
coefficients for the two variables are statistically significant across most of the regions in Panel A, 
whereas the results in Panel B are weaker. A similar finding can be observed for the availability of 
hedging substitutes represented by DIY and LIQ. Furthermore, the signs and the levels of statistical 
significance of the coefficients for CPX and MTB differ between the world regions. This might either 
be reasoned by real differences in the relevance of the underinvestment hypothesis across countries, or 
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again by the fact that growth options itself are not the best proxy because underinvestment theory 
predicts an interaction between debt ratio and growth options. Finally, ICR and OOS both show 
significant results with expected signs in Panel A, whereas the evidence in Panel B is either weak (for 
ICR) or shows a reverse sign (for OOS). 
Weak support across multiple regions, independent of whether looking at Panel A or Panel B, can be 
confirmed for RAD, SOS and TLC. One exception is the strong effect of R&D expenses on the hedging 
decision of European firms. 
In summary, the regional subgroup analysis reveals some crucial geographical differences in the 
relevance of the hedging determinants. A comparison between the results for the pooled sample (Tab. 
5) and the subgroups (Tab. 6) underlines this conclusion, as, for example, the coefficients for LIQ do 
not show significant results in the full sample, but when dividing the sample into regional clusters, 
liquidity seems to be an important substitute for hedging in three out of five regions (Panel A). Thus, 
making inferences about the hedging determinants without accounting for regional differences might 
end up in incorrect conclusions. 
6.3 Analysis of heterogeneity 
So far, the basic MRA explicitly considered the biasing effect of publication selection as well as 
heterogeneity arising from geographical differences. A shortcoming of this approach is the omission of 
other potentially important variables measuring methodological heterogeneity across studies. Moreover, 
the impact of the world regions is only analyzed by creating subgroups, which neglects possible 
interdependencies between the country clusters. The multivariate MRA model accounts for this issue 
by simultaneously testing the impact of a broad set of structural and methodological differences.  
Tab. 7 and 8 show the results for the augmented MRA from Eq. (4). Again, 𝑆𝐸(𝑟) is added to all 
models to ensure that the results are robust to publication selection. For the regional dummies, 
coefficients are not reported for less than 15 observations. The exclusion of variables for methodological 
differences from some models is reasoned by one of the following aspects: (i) There are no estimates 
reported in the primary studies. For example, no observation is available for the impact of CPX on the 
extent of hedging in single-industry studies. (ii) The control variable is obsolete. For example, it would 
be meaningless to add a dummy indicating the inclusion of a geographical diversification variable 
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(Control GDF) in the model for GDF. For the same reason, the control variable for managerial risk 
aversion (Control MAV) is not considered in the models for OOS and SOS. (iii) Variables are subject to 
multicollinearity. In this case, the most insignificant among the correlated variables was dropped until 
the mean variance inflation factor has a value below 10. For example, the average year of the primary 
study data is left out due to the high collinearity with the panel data dummy in the model for RAD (Panel 
A). 
<<< INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE >>> 
 
<<< INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE >>> 
 
For the interpretation of the estimated coefficients, it should be noted that North America is left out as 
base category. Hence, the regression parameters for the other country clusters indicate if the relation 
between the respective hedging determinant and the hedging variable is systematically different 
compared to North America. This means that, in contrast to the basic MRA, the augmented model 
analyzes whether differences in the effects across the country groups are large enough to be statistically 
significant. Moreover, the methodological variables show if the presence of a specific method choice 
affects the size of the partial correlations. Due to the large amount of results, we will not interpret all 
coefficients but rather focus on key findings. The first section refers to the geographical differences. 
Overall findings. The total number of statistically significant coefficients 23  uncovers that the 
importance of the hedging determinants is not equal in all countries. Differences are apparent in each 
cluster. The strongest and statistically significant deviations from the base category (North America) 
could be found for GDF, LIQ, OOS, and RAD (Panel A) as well as DIY, FSZ, and PRO (Panel B). 
Hence, researchers combining observations from different regions without controlling for these 
differences should be careful with the interpretation of the results. Furthermore, there are only a few 
coefficients with similar estimates in both subsamples (Panel A and B), which supports the view that 
the decision to hedge and the extent of hedging are driven by different dimensions. 
DIY (Panel A and B). The coefficient for European countries is significant and positive for both the 
decision to hedge (0.024) and the extent of hedging (0.092). For the group of East Asian & Pacific 
                                                     
23 Results are classified as statistically significant if they have p-values equal to or less than 0.05. 
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countries, the same effect can be found in Panel B. Compared to North America, dividend payout seems 
to be a more important determinant for corporate hedging policy in these two regions. Following La 
Porta et al. (2000), an explanation for this finding could be that dividend payouts are often higher in 
European countries (e.g., Germany or Spain) and the East Asia & Pacific region (e.g., Australia or Hong 
Kong). As a consequence, firms located in one of these countries might have greater incentives for 
hedging to reduce financial distress and agency conflicts of debt arising from higher dividend payments.  
DRA and FSA (Panel A). Looking at highly developed country groups (North America, Europe, and 
East Asia & Pacific), the debt ratio and foreign sales variables do not exhibit meaningful differences 
regarding the magnitude of the partial correlations. This underlines the similar importance of the two 
variables for the decision to hedge in the three regions, a result already documented in the basic MRA. 
FSZ (Panel A and B). Except of the global studies, the insignificant MRA coefficients in Panel A 
indicate that firm size is an equally important factor for the corporate hedging decision. In contrast, firm 
size is (on average) more relevant for the hedging extent in Europe, East Asia & Pacific, and global 
studies. This might again be reasoned by the fact that the high liquidity of the financial markets in North 
America improves the availability of financial hedging instruments, also for small firms. 
GDF (Panel A). For the decision to hedge, it can be observed that the degree of geographical 
diversification is, on average, a less important determinant in European countries and the East Asia & 
Pacific region. An interpretation for this finding could be that an increased risk exposure from 
geographical diversification induces North American firms to hedge, while firms in the other regions 
more often use diversification as operational hedging strategy, which results in lower or even negative 
effects of GDF on hedging.  
LIQ (Panel A and B). The coefficient of the Rest of the World dummy (−0.101) is negative and highly 
significant, whereas the same result with a reverse sign (0.102) can be found for the decision to hedge. 
It might be concluded that firms in countries with less liquid derivatives markets face higher costs for 
financial hedging and thus cash management serves as an appropriate substitute. However, when 
initially deciding whether or not to engage in hedging other factors, such as firm size, are predominant. 
The second group of the variables covers methodological differences. The main findings can be 
described as follows. 
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Differences in the hedging variable. From the estimates in Panel A it becomes apparent that studies 
considering operational strategies as part of their hedging definition report, on average, lower effects 
for CPX, DIY, and FSZ. The results also suggest that the impact of the hedging determinants depends 
on the type of risk exposure. For example, the coefficients for the foreign exchange exposure dummy 
(FX only) in the DRA models are negative and statistically significant (Panel A and B). As the omitted 
category refers to samples with mixed exposures, this finding shows that for FX hedgers, the effect of 
the debt ratio is less important because this proxy especially reflects aspects related to interest rate 
exposure. In the same way, the dummy for studies focusing on IR hedgers (IR only) is negative and 
significant for the FX-related proxies such as GDF in Panel A or FSA in Panel B. 
Data characteristics. The variable for the exclusion of firms without ex ante exposure shows that if 
studies focus on firms that are exposed to market prices risks, they often find a stronger link between 
FSA and the extent of hedging (Panel B). The results also suggest that the effects of some determinants 
will be reduced when using panel data sets for the analysis instead of cross-sections. For example, the 
panel data dummy has a negative coefficient on the impact of FSA and FSZ in Panel B. In addition, the 
average year of the primary study’s data set has a systematic impact on the effect of several hedging 
determinants. For instance, the coefficients in the models for CPX, DIY, and DRA are all significant 
with values around 0.002 in Panel A. In other words, using more recent data seems to increase the 
partial correlation coefficients for these determinants by a factor of 0.002 each year, assuming other 
things equal. It can also be derived that studies focusing on one specific industry often find a stronger 
relation between the proxies and the hedging measure (especially for LIQ and SOS in Panel A, or FSA, 
FSZ, LIQ, and PRO in Panel B). Therefore, researchers using more homogenous firm samples tend to 
obtain larger estimates for some of the hedging determinants. 
Estimation characteristics. Controlling for endogeneity is important in some cases. For instance, the 
control variable is negative and statistically significant for LIQ in Panel A and B meaning that studies 
accounting for endogeneity yield, on average, a stronger substitution effect for liquidity. It is remarkable 
that the significant coefficients for the endogeneity variable show high levels of significance. Thus, if 
studies accounting for endogenous relations in their models yield different estimates, these differences 
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are vital. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the number of observations for studies controlling for 
endogeneity is typically low. This weakens the explanatory power of the control variable. 
Specification characteristics. The estimates for the variables reflecting specification differences reveal 
that the inclusion of important control variables in the primary studies systematically influences the 
partial correlation coefficients between the hedging determinants and the dependent hedging measure. 
For example, most of the coefficients for Control MAV have negative signs in Panel A. Therefore, 
adding a control for the managerial risk aversion hypothesis often decreases the reported estimates. 
Publication characteristics. There is evidence that the quality of the publication outlet has an impact 
on the reported results. However, the direction of this effect is not obvious. For some of the hedging 
determinants, the coefficients indicate that estimates collected from top journals reduce the outcome 
predicted by theory. For example, in Panel B, the coefficient of the Top journal dummy is negative in 
the models for FSA and FSZ as well as positive for ICR and OOS. In contrast, the variable implies 
higher values than the average partial correlations for PRO or SOS in Panel A. 
7 Discussion 
7.1 Summary of results from multivariate analysis 
To see the overall picture of the diverse results for the fourteen hedging determinants, we aggregate 
the findings reported in Tab. 7 and 8. Tab. 9 summarizes the results for the regional differences. The 
coefficients of the single determinants are aggregated for each hedging hypothesis as defined in Tab. 1. 
The first digit in brackets represents the number of significant effects (at least at the 5% level). The 
second digit in brackets is the total number of hedging determinants with results reported in the 
multivariate MRA. The sign shown before brackets refers to the dominating sign of the effect on the 
decision to hedge (Panel A) and the extent of hedging (Panel B). Signs of the MRA results from Tab. 7 
and 8 are counted as positive (negative) if the coefficient is identical (the opposite) to the predicted sign 
of the hedging determinant. A positive (negative) sign reported in Tab. 9 means that this effect is 
stronger (weaker) in a certain world region as compared to the North America. 
 
<<< INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE >>> 
From Tab. 9, we can see that geographical differences are especially present for the hypotheses that 
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financial distress, managerial risk aversion, and the availability of hedging substitutes foster corporate 
hedging activities. The negative signs of the Non-US world regions indicate that financial distress costs 
are a less important driver for hedging outside the US. Even stronger is the result for the managerial risk 
aversion hypothesis on the decision to hedge (Panel A). Accordingly, managerial stock and option 
ownership are more important factors for hedging in countries outside the US. Finally, the availability 
of substitutes for derivatives hedging like geographical diversification and liquidity is more pronounced 
in other countries than the US. This result is not surprising, as the US has the maturest derivatives 
markets and thus alternative hedging strategies are more important in countries with more restricted 
access to derivatives instruments. A finding, which is also in line with previous studies on the country-
level drivers of hedging (Bartram et al., 2009). 
<<< INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE >>> 
Similar as in Tab. 9, we summarize the findings for the methodological heterogeneity analysis. In Tab. 
10, a positive (negative) dominating sign indicates that this moderator has a positive (negative) overall 
impact on the decision to hedge (Panel A) and the extend of hedging (Panel B). Although many variables 
reveal substantial explanatory power for the differences in empirical findings, four main moderators can 
be identified for the decision to hedge: Average year, Data from survey, Control MAV, and Top journal. 
The coefficients for these variables are statistically significant in at least 50% of the models shown in 
Tab. 7 and 8. Regarding the sign of these variables, we find that the influence of the hedging 
determinants on the decision to hedge is stronger for more recent sample years, lower for survey data 
compared to hedging data coded from annual reports, and lower for studies including control variables 
for managerial risk aversion, as well as stronger for publications in highly ranked journals. Seven 
variables are classified as the main moderators for the extent of hedging: Single industry, Foreign 
exchange risk, Interest rate risk, Commodity risk, Control MAV, Control GDF, and Top Journal. 
Regarding the sign of the variables, we can conclude that the impact of the hedging determinants on the 
extent of hedging is stronger in studies focusing on firms from a specific industry, stronger (weaker) for 
explicit interest rate and commodity price (foreign exchange) hedgers compared to findings for mixed 
exposures, stronger (weaker) for studies including control variables for managerial risk aversion 
(geographical diversification), and stronger for publications in highly ranked journals. Interestingly, 
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there is also evidence that accounting for operational hedging methods (Panel A) and endogeneity (Panel 
B) are responsible for differences in the findings across studies. While considering operational activities 
in the hedging measure reduces the impact of the hedging determinants, there is no clear sign for the 
impact of endogeneity correction. 
7.2 Robustness 
To evaluate the robustness of the heterogeneity analysis, a variety of sensitivity analyses has been 
conducted. The results are reported in the online supplements S8-S13. First, we use Fisher’s z-
transformation of the partial correlation coefficients to account for the skewness in the distribution of 
the partial correlation (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2012). A comparison with the MRA coefficients from 
the main results reveals that the findings are quite robust against the transformation of the effect size.  
Second, we also cluster standard errors of the MRA model at the level of study authors. This approach 
accounts for the fact that some authors are presented in multiple studies. For example, Knopf et al. 
(2002) investigate the hedging behavior of US firms and Hagelin et al. (2007) look at Swedish firms. In 
both studies, John D. Knopf is a co-author. In this case, it could be argued that estimates taken from 
different studies having the same author(s) are likely to show some kind of dependency due to 
idiosyncratic author characteristics. The corresponding results are fairly close to the main findings 
discussed in the previous section, just the t-statistics slightly change for some coefficients due to the 
adjusted standard errors. 
Third, beyond the endogeneity concerns in the primary studies, there may also exists a potential 
endogeneity in the MRA model. After the coding of the studies, we had to drop many aspects of study 
design due to collinearity problems. If the omitted variables affect the reported estimates and their 
standard errors in the same direction, the correlation between the error term  and the standard error 
𝑆𝐸(𝑟)  might result in biased estimates of the coefficient measuring publication selection bias 
(Havranek, 2015). A potential solution for this issue is to use an appropriate instrument for the standard 
error. Havranek et al. (2017) suggests the inverted squared root of the degrees of freedom (1/√𝑑𝑓) as 
they are directly proportional to the standard error (larger studies are usually more precise), but less 
likely to be influenced by method choices. Whereas the coefficients for the regional dummies remain 
stable, the bias coefficients in the model for GDF indicates no more evidence for publication selection 
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in Panel A. Similar conclusions can be drawn for the FSA and FSZ models in Panel B. Nevertheless, 
there still remains strong evidence for publication selection bias in the models for FSZ, FSA, and RAD 
(Panel A) as well as DRA, ICR, RAD, and TLC (Panel B). This underpins the importance of controlling 
for selective reporting in the MRA models. 
7.3 Limitations 
Every meta-analysis is limited by constraints from the primary studies being synthesized. Two of the 
most important challenges in the empirical examination of the hedging determinants are the endogeneity 
concerns arising from the reverse causality among the various aspects of corporate financial policy, and 
the fact that most studies focus on derivatives use although theory refers to a broader definition of 
hedging (Aretz and Bartram, 2010). To mitigate biasing effects from these issues, we include control 
variables in the MRA in order to identify whether studies addressing endogeneity or using a broader 
definition of hedging yield systematically different results. A drawback of this procedure is that the 
problem of endogeneity is only addressed in a handful of studies. Similarly, a small proportion of studies 
considers other hedging strategies beyond derivatives use in their hedging variable. Therefore, final 
conclusions about the real impact of the two issues can hardly be drawn.   
Another limitation concerns the interpretation of the hedging determinants. Taking into account 
selective hedging considerations, it remains unclear whether a certain finding should be interpreted as a 
test for risk reduction or market timing (Adam and Fernando, 2006; Géczy et al., 1997). A significant 
number of primary studies in our sample tackles this issue either by highlighting that all firms in their 
sample use financial derivatives to achieve risk reduction, or by excluding firms with derivatives held 
for speculation or trading purposes (Choi et al., 2013; Goldberg et al., 1998; Huang et al., 2007). If 
derivatives would be used for speculation as opposed to risk reduction, firms should hedge independent 
of their risk exposure. However, the MRA results strongly suggest that the exposure variables (debt 
ratio, foreign sales, geographical diversification) are positively related to hedging. 
8 Conclusion 
This paper presents a meta-regression analysis of 7,024 empirical estimates on the influence of the 
fourteen most commonly examined rationales for hedging activities of non-financial firms. The 
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aggregation of the existing research record within the basic meta-regression reveals that firm size, capital 
structure, and risk exposure are key determinants for the decision to hedge. Moreover, firm size, interest 
coverage, and option ownership are key determinants for the extent of hedging. The actual strength of 
the effects depends on the examined country. Relating the findings to the classical hedging theories 
underpins the relevance of the economies of scale and the risk exposure hypothesis. Some support can 
be confirmed for the theory that the availability of hedging substitutes or the reduction of expected costs 
of financial distress motivate a firm’s hedging policy. Finally, there is weak or even no robust evidence 
that firms hedge to avoid underinvestment, to realize tax benefits, or that undiversifiable risk positions 
induce managers to hedge for the sake of their own interests. 
The multivariate MRA incorporates a broad set of variables to measure differences across world 
regions and methodological characteristics of the primary studies. The analysis underpins that the 
importance of several hedging determinants significantly varies across countries. Especially the impact 
of variables measuring managerial risk aversion and hedging substitutes is more pronounced in countries 
outside the US. Moreover, we find several methodological and data-related aspects to explain the large 
heterogeneity. Especially the inclusion of relevant control variables for managerial risk aversion in the 
primary study models and the journal ranking of the publication outlet matter. Moreover, for the decision 
to hedge it is also relevant whether hedging data is obtained from surveys as compared to annual reports 
and which sample years are examined. For the extent of hedging, the type of risk exposure being hedged, 
and the specific industry drive the reported results. Moreover, also accounting for endogeneity is a 
relevant factor. 
The theoretical explanations of corporate hedging abstract from country-specific features, thereby 
supposing that the theories are equally important for firms independent of their legal, economic, and 
financial environment. However, the outcomes of the MRA challenge this assumption and give rise to 
the proposition that the classical theories should be extended by a further dimension covering the 
country-specific firm surroundings. Compared to regional differences, methodological aspects of the 
study-design explain even a larger proportion of the heterogeneity in the collected effect sizes. These 
results should be considered when comparing and interpreting empirical estimates for the hedging 
determinants from studies looking at different countries or applying different econometric models.  
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Hedging theories and predicted signs for relation between 
proxy and hedging variable 
FIN UND TAX MNG SUB EXP EOS 
Capex CPX [Capital expenditures] ÷ [measure of firm size]  +      
Dividend yield DIY [Cash dividends (per share)] ÷ [(earnings per share) or 
(closing share price) or (market value of common 
equity)]; [Dummy that indicates whether a firm pays 
dividends] 
    +   
Debt ratio DRA [(Total debt) or (long-term debt) or (short-term debt) or 
(industry-adjusted debt) (+ book value of preferred 
stock)] ÷ [measure of firm size] 
+ +    +  
Foreign sales FSA [(Foreign sales) or (foreign income)] ÷ [measure of firm 
size]; [Dummy that indicates whether a firm has foreign 
sales]  
     +  
Firm size FSZ [Total assets] or [total sales] or [market value of 
common equity (+ book value of preferred stock) (+ 
book value of debt)] 
−      + 
Geographical 
diversification 
GDF [Number of (countries where a firm operates) or 
(currencies)], or [Herfindahl-Hirschman index over 
(countries) or (regions where a firm operates)]; 
[Dummy that indicates whether a firm operates in more 
than one country] 
    − +  
Interest 
coverage ratio 
ICR [(Gross profit) or (EBIT)] ÷ [interest expenses] 
−       
Liquidity LIQ [(Cash (and cash equivalents) or (current assets (– 
inventory))] ÷ [(current liabilities) or (a measure of firm 
size)] 
    −   
Market-to-book 
ratio 
MTB [Market value of (common equity) or (assets) (+ book 
value of debt)] ÷ [book value of (common equity) or 
(assets) or (replacement costs of assets)] 
 +      
Option 
ownership 
OOS [(Number) or (market value) of options held by (CEO) 
or (managers) or/and (directors)] ÷ [(number of 
managers) or (total compensation)]; [Dummy that 
indicates whether options are held by (CEO) or 
(managers) or/and (directors)] 
   −    
Profitability PRO [Return on assets] or [return on capital employed] or 
[(gross profit) or (operating profit) or (net profit)] ÷ 
[sales] or [operating profit ÷ number of outstanding 
shares] 
−       
Research and 
development 
RAD [Expenses for research and development] ÷ [measure of 
firm size]; [Dummy that indicates whether a firm has 
expenses for research and development] 
 +      
Share 
ownership 
SOS [(Number) or (market value) of shares held by (CEO) or 
(managers) or/and (directors)] ÷ [(total assets) or (total 
number of outstanding shares)]; [Dummy that indicates 
whether managers held stocks] 
   +    
Tax-loss carry 
forwards 
TLC [Tax loss carry forwards (+ tax credits)] ÷ [a measure of 
firm size]; [Dummy that indicates the availability of tax 
loss carry forwards] 
+  +     
Notes: This table shows the fourteen hedging determinants that are identified to be the most commonly examined variables in the literature. The 
predicted signs indicate whether theory assumes a positive or negative relation between the proxy and the hedging variable. The assignment of the 
hedging determinants to the theories and the predicted signs are based on Aretz and Bartram (2010), Haushalter (2000), and Judge (2006). Logarithmic 
transformations of the variables are left out to reduce complexity. 
FIN = Financial distress costs; UND = Underinvestment; TAX = Tax benefits; MNG = Managerial risk aversion; SUB = Hedging substitutes; EXP = 
Risk exposure; EOS = Economies of scale. 
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Table 2. Definition of explanatory variables for structural heterogeneity 
Variable Definition 
Geographical differences  
North America (Omitted base category) = 1 if an estimate refers to firm data from North America, 0 otherwise. 
Europe = 1 if an estimate refers to firm data from Europe, 0 otherwise. 
East Asia & Pacific = 1 if an estimate refers to firm data from East Asia & Pacific, 0 otherwise. 
Rest of the World = 1 if an estimate refers to firm data from Latin America & Caribbean, Middle East & North 
Africa, South Asia, or Sub-Saharan Africa, 0 otherwise. 
Global = 1 if an estimate refers to pooled firm data from more than one region, 0 otherwise. 
Industry differences  
Single industry = 1 if a specific industry is examined, 0 for mixed industry samples. 
Notes: This table defines the moderator variables for structural heterogeneity. 
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Table 3. Definition of explanatory variables for methodological heterogeneity 
Variable Definition 
Differences in the hedging measure  
Operational hedging includeda = 1 if the hedging variable includes operational strategies and other financial instruments, 0 if 
hedging variables refers to derivatives users only. 
Risk reduction only = 1 if a study explicitly excludes firms with derivatives holdings for selective hedging, 0 otherwise. 
FX only = 1 if the hedging variable refers to FX hedgers only, 0 otherwise. 
IR only = 1 if the hedging variable refers to IR hedgers only, 0 otherwise. 
CP only = 1 if the hedging variable refers to CP hedgers only, 0 otherwise. 
Mixed exposure (Base category) = 1 if the hedging variable refers to hedgers of more than one exposure, 0 otherwise. 
Alternative hedging measureb = 1 if the net notional amount of outstanding derivatives, fair value of outstanding derivatives, or 
the delta percentage of the derivatives portfolio is used as continuous hedging variable, 0 if the total 
notional amount is used. 
Data characteristics  
Ex ante exposure = 1 if a sample excludes firms without ex ante risk exposure, 0 otherwise. 
Avg. Year Average year of the data under examination (1995 as base). 
Panel data = 1 if the study examines panel data, 0 for cross-sectional data. 
Survey data = 1 if hedging data is obtained from a survey, 0 otherwise. 
Estimation characteristics  
Fixed effects = 1 if industry, year, or country fixed effects are included, 0 if otherwise. 
Endogeneity = 1 if the model accounts for reverse causality, 0 otherwise. 
Logita = 1 if a Logit model is used for estimation, 0 if a Probit model is used. 
Craggb = 1 if estimation with a continuous hedging variable accounts for sample selection bias via two-
stage modeling as proposed by Cragg (1971) or Heckman (1979), 0 otherwise. 
Specification characteristics  
Control EXP = 1 if the model includes a control variable for a firm’s risk exposure, 0 otherwise. 
Control ASI = 1 if the model includes a control variable for asymmetric information, 0 otherwise. 
Control MAV = 1 if the model includes a control variable for managerial risk aversion, 0 otherwise. 
Control OFH = 1 if the model includes a control variable for other financial hedging instruments except of 
derivatives, 0 otherwise. 
Control GDF = 1 if the model includes a control variable for geographical diversification, 0 otherwise. 
Publication characteristics  
Top journal = 1 if an estimate comes from a published journal article with a SJR rank above 1.0, 0 otherwise. 
Notes: This table provides an overview of the explanatory variables for methodological differences among the collected effect estimates.  
a This variable is only analyzed for the relation between the hedging determinants and the decision to hedge. 
b This variable is only analyzed for the relation between the hedging determinants and the extent of hedging. 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics of meta-regression variables 
 Panel A: Decision to hedge Panel B: Extent of hedging Panel C: Full sample 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Structural heterogeneity       
North America  
(Base category) 
0.384 0.486 0.604 0.489 0.478 0.500 
Europe 0.283 0.451 0.110 0.313 0.209 0.406 
East Asia & Pacific 0.192 0.394 0.179 0.383 0.186 0.389 
Rest of the World 0.044 0.205 0.036 0.188 0.041 0.198 
Global 0.120 0.326 0.075 0.264 0.101 0.301 
Single industry 0.208 0.406 0.261 0.439 0.231 0.422 
Hedging variable       
Op. hedging included 0.154 0.361 - - 0.104 0.305 
Risk reduction only 0.043 0.203 0.073 0.261 0.056 0.230 
Alt. hedging measure - - 0.470 0.499 0.202 0.401 
Mixed exposure 0.410 0.492 0.342 0.474 0.381 0.486 
Foreign exchange risk 0.360 0.480 0.300 0.458 0.334 0.472 
Interest rate risk 0.108 0.311 0.132 0.338 0.118 0.323 
Commodity risk 0.108 0.310 0.228 0.419 0.159 0.366 
Data characteristics       
Ex ante exposure 0.206 0.405 0.361 0.480 0.272 0.445 
Avg. year 5.897 5.045 3.521 5.039 4.877 5.177 
Panel data 0.425 0.494 0.530 0.499 0.470 0.499 
Data from survey 0.165 0.371 0.125 0.330 0.148 0.355 
Estimation characteristics       
Fixed effects 0.534 0.499 0.437 0.496 0.492 0.500 
Endogeneity 0.032 0.177 0.055 0.229 0.042 0.201 
Logit 0.565 0.496 - - 0.324 0.468 
Cragg - - 0.186 0.389 0.088 0.283 
Specification characteristics       
Control EXP 0.706 0.456 0.501 0.500 0.618 0.486 
Control ASI 0.286 0.452 0.389 0.488 0.330 0.470 
Control MAV 0.518 0.500 0.621 0.485 0.562 0.496 
Control OFH 0.220 0.414 0.117 0.321 0.176 0.380 
Control GDF 0.172 0.377 0.064 0.244 0.125 0.331 
Publication characteristics       
Top journal 0.367 0.482 0.504 0.500 0.426 0.495 
#Obs. 4,010 3,014 7,024 
#Studies 137 90 175 
Notes: This table presents the descriptive statistics for the variables measuring methodological heterogeneity. Variable definitions are 
reported in Tab. 3. 
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Panel A: Decision to hedge              
Mean effect (?̂?0) 0.022
*** 0.027*** 0.039*** 0.102*** 0.122*** 0.144*** -0.011*** -0.022* -0.008 -0.002 0.012*** 0.005 0.003 0.004 
 (9.25) (2.84) (10.09) (16.25) (21.71) (3.73) (-3.25) (-1.91) (-1.01) (-1.05) (3.88) (1.39) (0.52) (1.15) 
Bias (?̂?1) 0.164 0.045 0.136 1.013
*** 1.246*** -2.031*** -0.712 -0.496* -0.115 0.236 0.205 1.858*** -1.078*** 0.259 
 (-0.67) (0.15) (0.61) (2.64) (5.44) (-2.60) (-1.34) (-1.75) (-0.46) (0.62) (0.54) (4.56) (-6.94) (1.57) 
#Obs. 111 292 608 279 631 110 152 455 374 160 271 171 187 208 
#Studies 30 58 115 63 128 18 25 93 73 26 42 35 45 48 
Panel B: Extent of hedging              
Mean effect (?̂?0) 0.008
*** 0.017 0.016*** 0.062* 0.087** -0.018 -0.046*** -0.009 -0.023*** 0.029*** -0.007*** 0.003 0.020 -0.003 
 (3.87) (1.29) (6.39) (1.92) (2.31) (-0.56) (-7.16) (-1.61) (-4.46) (4.11) (-8.20) (0.87) (1.00) (-0.82) 
Bias (?̂?1) 0.087 -0.080 1.535
*** 1.525* 0.431 1.324*** -0.169 -0.510*** 0.735** -1.656*** 0.053 1.440*** 0.312 -0.092 
 (0.62) (-0.27) (4.65) (1.73) (0.90) (2.95) (-0.52) (-3.70) (2.21) (-3.46) (0.24) (4.19) (1.57) (-0.22) 
#Obs. 152 207 465 174 482 37 80 289 235 151 149 165 250 178 
#Studies 24 37 79 35 85 13 14 65 50 25 27 27 39 29 
Notes: This table reports the results of Eq. (3). The model is estimated by weighted least squares estimation using the inverse of the estimates’ squared standard errors as weights. ?̂?1 measures the presence and magnitude 
of publication selection bias. ?̂?0 measures the mean effect corrected for publication selection. For the calculation of the mean effects, 𝑆𝐸(𝑟𝑖𝑗) in Eq. (3) is replaced by 𝑆𝐸(𝑟𝑖𝑗)2, which has been shown to yield a better 
correction for publication selection (Stanley and Doucouliagos, 2014). The t-statistics of the regression parameters reported in parentheses are based on robust errors, clustered at study-level and country-level. Columns 
represent the fourteen determinants that are most commonly examined in the hedging literature, with definitions reported in Tab. 1.  
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Panel A: Decision to hedge              
North America 0.024*** 0.002 0.042*** 0.095** 0.119*** 0.200*** 0.016 -0.040*** 0.0001 -0.004 0.006 0.001 0.004 0.004 
Europe 0.013 0.032*** 0.050*** 0.148*** 0.141*** 0.071** -0.069*** -0.052*** 0.004 0.012 0.017** 0.202*** -0.020 -0.019* 
East Asia & 
Pacific 
 0.076*** 0.040** 0.174*** 0.148***  0.037 0.024 -0.014** -0.033** 0.007 0.006 0.003 0.041*** 
Rest of the World   0.040 0.054*** 0.142*** 0.049***  0.013 0.023**      
Global  0.034*** 0.030*** 0.158*** 0.093**  -0.009*** -0.028*** -0.020** -0.005*** 0.015    
Panel B: Extent of hedging              
North America 0.010** 0.003 0.015 0.094*** 0.043*** 0.163*** 0.038 -0.013*** -0.022*** 0.031** -0.006*** -0.001 0.001 -0.002 
Europe -0.123*** 0.045 -0.173 0.161*** 0.457***   -0.008 -0.021  -0.011  0.061 0.251* 
East Asia & 
Pacific 
 0.087*** 0.017 0.248*** 0.175***   0.006 -0.041***   0.025*** -0.052*** 0.021 
Rest of the World   0.012  0.080***   -0.069 0.034***      
Global  0.046*** 0.043**  0.161***    0.010***  0.014***  0.085***  
Notes: This table reports the mean effects corrected for publication selection (?̂?0) observed from the estimation of equation (3) with squared standard error. The model is estimated by weighted least squares estimation 
using the inverse of the estimates’ squared standard errors as weights. The slope estimate ?̂?1 and the t-statistics (clustered at study-level) are both unreported. Moreover, estimates with less than fifteen observations are 
unreported to avoid small-sample bias. Columns represent the fourteen determinants that are most commonly examined in the hedging literature, with definitions reported in Tab. 1.  
Asterisks indicate statistical significance: *** 𝑝 < 0.01, ** 𝑝 < 0.05, * 𝑝 < 0.10. 
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Panel A: Decision to hedge              
Intercept 0.043* 0.009 0.079*** 0.065*** 0.157*** 0.105*** 0.008 -0.034* -0.016 0.011 0.074** 0.034 -0.049 -0.006 
 (1.80) (0.85) (4.76) (5.25) (5.64) (8.32) (0.46) (-1.75) (-0.89) (0.52) (2.37) (0.75) (-1.31) (-0.35) 
SE(r) 0.491 0.316 -0.041 1.030*** 1.363*** -2.459** -0.447 -0.422* 0.120 0.098 0.031 1.830** 0.025 0.295 
 (1.13) (0.87) (-0.10) (3.20) (4.62) (-2.57) (-1.09) (-1.92) (0.47) (0.20) (0.07) (2.33) (0.10) (1.27) 
Europe 0.004 0.024*** 0.023 0.009 0.025 -0.115*** -0.024 -0.025 -0.011 -0.027** 0.002 -0.105** -0.079** -0.004 
 (0.27) (2.59) (0.98) (0.51) (1.37) (-6.56) (-1.04) (-1.35) (-0.82) (-2.02) (0.10) (-2.48) (-2.28) (-0.26) 
East Asia & Pacif.  0.021 0.013 0.086* 0.015  0.049** 0.021** -0.007 -0.080*** -0.0001 -0.032** -0.022 0.030* 
  (1.39) (0.84) (1.67) (0.56)  (2.74) (2.09) (-0.36) (-3.07) (-0.01) (-2.49) (-0.86) (1.66) 
Rest of the World   0.025 -0.071*** 0.015 -0.158***  0.102*** 0.068*      
   (0.95) (-3.28) (0.40) (-5.91)  (5.34) (1.96)      
Global  0.019 -0.053** 0.011 -0.073***  -0.017* 0.004* 0.013 -0.035*** 0.033**    
  (1.62) (-2.06) (0.48) (-3.19)  (-1.75) (1.83) (0.81) (-5.52) (2.34)    
Single industry -0.035*** -0.016* -0.012 0.003 0.020 -0.036 -0.027 -0.024** -0.028  -0.010 0.002 0.023*** -0.015 
 (-3.83) (-1.72) (-0.38) (0.15) (0.77) (-0.55) (-0.63) (-2.28) (-1.03)  (-0.44) (0.08) (2.68) (-0.91) 
Op. hedging incl. -0.049*** -0.079*** -0.022 -0.004 -0.075***  -0.232*** 0.004 0.034* -0.011 -0.005  0.070*** 0.002 
 (-2.62) (-5.36) (-1.12) (-0.11) (-2.62)  (-8.38) (0.21) (1.75) (-0.25) (-0.21)  (4.77) (0.06) 
Risk red. only  0.023* -0.061** -0.075 0.006 0.080*** -0.091** -0.030* 0.022 0.152* 0.135*** 0.052 0.018 -0.004 
  (1.80) (-2.38) (-1.39) (0.12) (6.00) (-2.59) (-1.78) (1.50) (1.87) (4.94) (1.38) (0.30) (-0.50) 
FX only -0.066*** 0.002 -0.035*** -0.012 0.006 0.109** -0.022*** 0.009 -0.006 -0.003 -0.024 -0.0001 0.045* -0.028*** 
 (-3.06) (0.34) (-2.68) (-1.12) (0.25) (2.26) (-4.88) (0.77) (-0.57) (-0.71) (-1.66) (-0.01) (1.71) (-4.01) 
IR only -0.076** 0.003 0.029 -0.095* -0.010 -0.102*** 0.004** -0.001 -0.013 -0.001 -0.027*** -0.003 0.059 -0.013 
 (-2.43) (0.34) (1.53) (-1.69) (-0.25) (-6.70) (2.34) (-0.06) (-1.21) (-0.10) (-5.17) (-0.06) (0.82) (-1.24) 
CP only 0.025 -0.009 -0.007  0.002 -0.063 -0.024*** 0.017 -0.021 -0.002 -0.024*** -0.252*** 0.018 0.019** 
 (0.93) (-1.54) (-0.45)  (0.09) (-1.30) (-9.84) (0.99) (-0.94) (-0.28) (-4.69) (-4.37) (0.71) (2.01) 
Ex ante exposure -0.0004 0.009 0.030 0.036 -0.0001 -0.023 0.123*** 0.017 0.013 0.001 0.0001 -0.032 -0.0004 0.022 
 (-0.02) (0.70) (1.47) (1.46) (-0.01) (-0.34) (3.24) (1.36) (0.42) (0.02) (0.01) (-0.69) (-0.02) (0.74) 
Avg. year 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** -0.004*** 0.006*  -0.000 0.003*** 0.005***  -0.005***  0.003 0.001 
 (2.63) (5.83) (3.26) (-4.29) (1.86)  (-0.04) (2.59) (4.51)  (-3.30)  (1.50) (1.09) 
Panel data -0.051*** -0.031*** -0.014* 0.025 -0.046 0.003 0.026 -0.038** 0.001 -0.018 0.003 -0.063** 0.008 -0.003 
 (-2.94) (-4.58) (-1.77) (1.25) (-1.31) (0.11) (0.84) (-2.47) (0.05) (-0.41) (0.19) (-2.54) (0.26) (-0.12) 
Survey data -0.015 0.051** 0.014 0.009 -0.029 0.348*** -0.050 0.048** -0.071*** 0.026 -0.048 -0.031*** -0.103*** 0.055*** 
 (-0.68) (2.06) (0.61) (0.32) (-0.88) (2.65) (-1.42) (2.14) (-3.54) (0.33) (-1.26) (-2.85) (-2.73) (3.29) 
Fixed effects 0.006 -0.010** 0.002 0.011 0.047*** 0.090*** 0.014*** 0.005 0.016  0.009 0.041*** -0.051*** -0.0001 
 (0.51) (-2.12) (1.05) (0.54) (3.07) (3.35) (3.95) (0.73) (1.46)  (0.91) (6.37) (-3.56) (-0.02) 















































Endogeneity 0.074*** 0.006 -0.013 -0.095* 0.003  -0.001 -0.037*** 0.033 0.030 0.032 0.000 -0.014  
 (11.07) (0.63) (-0.87) (-1.86) (0.06)  (-0.03) (-3.98) (1.55) (0.75) (0.65) (0.02) (-1.31)  
Logit -0.009 0.018*** -0.018** 0.036 -0.036***   -0.001 -0.014** 0.027*** -0.005 -0.003 0.010 0.011 
 (-1.40) (3.22) (-2.51) (1.33) (-3.01)   (-0.12) (-2.09) (2.62) (-0.66) (-0.94) (0.62) (1.39) 
Control EXP -0.005  -0.031**  -0.025   -0.021* -0.019**   -0.011 -0.002  
 (-0.82)  (-2.29)  (-1.37)   (-1.82) (-2.50)   (-0.66) (-0.21)  
Control ASI 0.005* 0.021 -0.035*** 0.054*** -0.021 0.030 -0.094*** 0.025* -0.007 0.002 -0.003 0.028*** 0.026*** -0.017*** 
 (1.72) (1.38) (-3.22) (2.74) (-1.06) (1.03) (-3.45) (1.73) (-0.74) (0.09) (-0.21) (4.45) (2.64) (-4.25) 
Control MAV -0.007*** -0.027*** -0.025** -0.035*** -0.103*** 0.019***  0.011* -0.012**  0.009 -0.017  -0.007 
 (-7.02) (-4.24) (-2.18) (-3.49) (-3.13) (4.39)  (1.70) (-2.26)  (0.83) (-1.54)  (-1.59) 
Control OFH 0.164***  0.029 -0.060*** 0.018 0.008  -0.029*** -0.018   0.028 -0.035 0.007 
 (7.27)  (1.57) (-3.12) (0.74) (0.12)  (-3.84) (-0.73)   (0.71) (-1.19) (0.30) 
Control GDF  -0.002 -0.008 0.023 -0.068***   -0.013 -0.009 0.048** -0.004 -0.007 -0.019 0.003 
  (-0.12) (-0.38) (1.32) (-3.21)   (-1.33) (-0.39) (2.32) (-0.37) (-1.50) (-1.04) (0.35) 
Top journal 0.019 0.011 0.038** -0.019** 0.012   0.025*** -0.000  -0.051*** -0.009 0.060*** 0.028*** 
 (1.01) (1.16) (2.01) (-2.14) (0.59)   (2.85) (-0.02)  (-3.04) (-0.65) (3.24) (5.03) 
Adj. R2 0.35 0.27 0.18 0.56 0.32 0.67 0.50 0.39 0.28 0.15 0.25 0.58 0.29 0.24 
#Obs. 111 292 607 279 630 110 152 454 373 160 271 171 187 208 
#Studies 30 58 115 63 128 18 25 93 73 26 42 35 45 48 
Notes: This table reports the results of Eq. (4). Regional dummies with less than fifteen observations are not included to avoid estimates suffering from small-sample bias. The model is estimated by weighted least squares 
estimation using the inverse of the estimates’ squared standard errors as weights. The t-statistics of the regression parameters reported in parentheses are based on robust errors, clustered at study-level and country-level. 
For the variables ICR and PRO, standard errors are only clustered at study-level as the number of country clusters is insufficient for the calculation of a robust covariance matrix. Columns represent the fourteen determinants 
that are most commonly examined in the hedging literature, with definitions reported in Tab. 1. Definitions of the explanatory variable can be found in Tab. 2 and 3. Coefficients for structural and methodological 
heterogeneity that are statistically significant, at least at the 5 % level, are highlighted in bold face.  
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Panel B: Extent of hedging              
Intercept -0.037*** -0.001 0.069*** 0.277*** 0.227*** 0.126 0.134*** -0.044*** 0.005 -0.021 -0.005 0.017 -0.069** -0.148*** 
 (-2.92) (-0.05) (2.59) (8.16) (4.49) (0.77) (6.64) (-2.79) (0.26) (-0.68) (-0.89) (0.59) (-2.57) (-8.43) 
SE(r) 0.057 -1.031** 0.985*** -1.380** -2.106** 0.907 -4.047*** 0.206 0.002 0.251 0.396 1.046** 0.318 1.958*** 
 (0.38) (-2.42) (2.68) (-2.43) (-2.37) (1.29) (-9.34) (0.58) (0.00) (0.46) (1.13) (2.38) (0.94) (4.98) 
Europe -0.062*** 0.092*** -0.151*** -0.055 0.206***   -0.013 -0.001  -0.061***  0.085 0.095*** 
 (-2.65) (6.89) (-4.08) (-1.02) (7.15)   (-0.35) (-0.01)  (-3.43)  (1.48) (2.85) 
East Asia & Pacif.  0.038*** -0.015 -0.017 0.107***   0.016 -0.019   -0.034* -0.095*** 0.039 
  (3.42) (-0.72) (-0.30) (2.59)   (0.71) (-0.77)   (-1.66) (-2.63) (1.15) 
Rest of the World   0.046  -0.004   -0.101*** 0.020      
   (0.66)  (-0.08)   (-2.90) (0.56)      
Global  0.044*** -0.009  0.112***    0.002  0.033***  -0.035*  
  (3.88) (-0.35)  (6.12)    (0.09)  (4.48)  (-1.70)  
Single industry  -0.016 -0.014 0.115*** 0.090** 0.027  -0.055*** -0.010  -0.038**  0.023 -0.058*** 
  (-0.77) (-1.46) (3.61) (2.11) (0.34)  (-3.39) (-0.61)  (-2.27)  (0.61) (-2.67) 
Risk red. only 0.010 0.003 -0.014 -0.002 0.003   -0.038*** 0.022 0.072** 0.015 -0.0001 -0.069* 0.099*** 
 (1.13) (0.46) (-0.97) (-0.05) (0.11)   (-2.95) (1.22) (2.11) (1.57) (-0.01) (-1.73) (13.97) 
Alt. hed. measure 0.015* 0.009 -0.003 0.012 -0.009 -0.049 -0.021*** 0.041*** -0.003 -0.071** -0.014*** -0.046*** 0.041* -0.014 
 (1.95) (1.03) (-0.19) (0.50) (-0.41) (-0.90) (-2.63) (3.39) (-0.21) (-1.98) (-4.62) (-4.60) (1.73) (-1.30) 
FX only   -0.034*** 0.007   0.049***  -0.033** 0.001 0.008 0.015 0.036** 0.043*** 
   (-3.38) (0.50)   (5.78)  (-2.46) (0.09) (1.28) (0.90) (2.42) (6.06) 
IR only -0.027* 0.033* 0.052** -0.055*** -0.092*  -0.021*** -0.012 -0.010 -0.029*** -0.007** -0.025** 0.034*** 0.002 
 (-1.78) (1.74) (2.22) (-3.07) (-1.93)  (-4.79) (-0.61) (-0.56) (-3.51) (-1.99) (-2.23) (3.72) (0.13) 
CP only 0.037** 0.050*** 0.073***  -0.016 0.040   -0.023 -0.073*** 0.012 -0.011  0.061*** 
 (2.53) (3.06) (4.21)  (-0.20) (0.21)   (-0.69) (-2.78) (1.39) (-0.84)  (7.31) 
Ex ante exposure 0.014 -0.009 -0.030 0.088*** 0.080*** -0.044* -0.054 0.043** 0.010 -0.033 -0.016 0.041*** -0.025* -0.050*** 
 (0.50) (-1.34) (-1.03) (2.74) (4.06) (-1.70) (-1.20) (2.32) (0.47) (-0.94) (-1.17) (4.98) (-1.86) (-7.15) 
Avg. year 0.003*   0.008***  -0.005 0.004   0.002   -0.001 0.009*** 
 (1.94)   (2.89)  (-1.44) (0.88)   (0.49)   (-0.21) (5.01) 
Panel data   -0.055 -0.069** -0.099*** -0.093 0.084   -0.013   0.072**  
   (-1.57) (-2.30) (-3.63) (-1.39) (1.15)   (-0.38)   (2.28)  
Survey data -0.004 -0.060* -0.004 0.240*** -0.050   0.022 0.008 0.060 -0.096*** 0.020** -0.168***  
 (-0.10) (-1.79) (-0.12) (8.28) (-1.43)   (1.16) (0.34) (0.88) (-5.77) (2.25) (-3.32)  
Fixed effects   0.017 0.008 -0.006 -0.011 -0.125** 0.010       
   (0.86) (0.33) (-0.19) (-0.66) (-2.28) (0.96)       















































Endogeneity -0.256*** -0.022 0.039 -0.306*** 0.068*   -0.130***  -0.172* 0.030 0.006 0.055***  
 (-8.08) (-0.68) (1.33) (-3.43) (1.92)   (-5.36)  (-1.78) (1.06) (0.24) (6.30)  
Selection bias 0.024 -0.097* 0.016 0.074*** -0.084  0.178** -0.057*** 0.000 -0.125*** -0.026 0.015 -0.084** -0.127* 
 (0.76) (-1.93) (0.51) (3.59) (-1.37)  (2.34) (-4.90) (0.00) (-5.62) (-0.51) (0.81) (-2.39) (-1.70) 
Control EXP 0.032*** -0.005 -0.045***  -0.004  -0.002 -0.014* 0.021* 0.039 0.026*** -0.005 0.032** 0.038*** 
 (3.04) (-0.63) (-4.93)  (-0.20)  (-0.17) (-1.82) (1.70) (1.39) (4.09) (-0.51) (2.16) (5.78) 
Control ASI 0.001 0.069*** 0.001 -0.054 0.028 0.009 0.023 0.024** -0.048*** 0.026 0.017**  0.018** 0.011* 
 (0.23) (6.39) (0.03) (-1.59) (1.34) (0.30) (1.60) (2.56) (-2.76) (1.51) (2.18)  (2.05) (1.66) 
Control MAV -0.001 0.038*** 0.036* -0.043*** -0.001 -0.242** -0.004 -0.047*** 0.031***  -0.034*** 0.016  -0.011 
 (-0.05) (3.37) (1.72) (-6.13) (-0.01) (-2.44) (-1.07) (-3.05) (4.81)  (-3.09) (1.40)  (-1.28) 
Control OFH 0.171*** 0.129*** -0.005 -0.049** 0.045 -0.047 0.329*** 0.071** 0.049  0.067*** 0.015 0.119*** -0.085 
 (7.59) (4.09) (-0.17) (-2.17) (1.00) (-0.66) (4.67) (2.57) (1.50)  (3.32) (0.67) (3.36) (-1.44) 
Control GDF   -0.004 -0.255*** -0.029   0.027 -0.027** -0.078** -0.123*** -0.145*** 0.016 0.055* 
   (-0.07) (-14.90) (-0.50)   (0.76) (-2.36) (-2.23) (-7.24) (-10.72) (0.78) (1.66) 
Top journal    -0.110*** -0.066*** 0.070 0.024*** -0.019  0.094***   0.056*** 0.027*** 
    (-9.55) (-2.84) (1.45) (3.54) (-1.47)  (8.83)   (2.83) (3.44) 
Adj. R2 0.39 0.56 0.40 0.63 0.58 0.74 0.59 0.32 0.31 0.57 0.20 0.51 0.45 0.42 
#Obs. 152 207 459 174 476 37 80 286 235 151 149 165 250 178 
#Studies 24 37 79 35 85 13 14 65 50 25 27 27 39 29 
Notes: This table reports the results of Eq. (4). Regional dummies with less than fifteen observations are not included to avoid estimates suffering from small-sample bias. The model is estimated by weighted least squares 
estimation using the inverse of the estimates’ squared standard errors as weights. The t-statistics of the regression parameters reported in parentheses are based on robust errors, clustered at study-level and country-level. 
Columns represent the fourteen determinants that are most commonly examined in the hedging literature, with definitions reported in Tab. 1. Definitions of the explanatory variable can be found in Tab. 2 and 3. Coefficients 
for structural and methodological heterogeneity that are statistically significant, at least at the 5 % level, are highlighted in bold face. 
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Table 9. No. of significant results (<0.05): Geographical heterogeneity 
 FIN UND TAX MNG SUB EXP EOS 
Panel A: Decision to hedge 
Europe    [0/5] – [1/4] [0/1] +/– [2/2]  + [2/3] – [1/3] [0/1] 
East Asia & Pacific – [1/5] – [1/3] [0/1]    + [1/2]    – [1/2]   [0/2] [0/1] 
Rest of the world    [0/2]    [0/2]   +/– [2/2] – [2/3] [0/1] 
Global – [3/4]  – [1/2]     + [1/1]      [0/2] – [1/2] – [1/1] 
Panel B: Extent of hedging 
Europe +/– [4/4] – [2/3] + [1/1] [0/1]  + [1/2] – [1/2] + [1/1] 
East Asia & Pacific   – [1/3]   [0/3]     [0/1] – [1/1]  + [1/2]   [0/2] + [1/1] 
Rest of the world      [0/2]   [0/2]    + [1/1]   [0/1] [0/1] 
Global   – [2/3]   [0/2]  [0/1]  + [1/1]   [0/1] + [1/1] 
Notes: This table summarizes the results for the regional differences reported in Tab. 7 and 8. Results of the hedging determinants are 
aggregated for each hedging hypothesis as defined in Tab. 1. The first digit in brackets represents the number of significant effects (at least 
at the 5% level) from the multivariate MRA results. The second digit in brackets is the total number of hedging determinants with results 
reported in the analysis of heterogeneity. The sign shown before brackets refers to the dominating sign of the effect on the decision to hedge 
(Panel A) and the extent of hedging (Panel B). Signs of the MRA results from Tab. 7 and 8 are counted as positive (negative) if the coefficient 
is identical (the opposite) to the predicted sign of the hedging determinant. A positive (negative) sign in Panel A/B indicates that this effect 
is stronger (weaker) in a certain world region as compared to North America.  
FIN = Financial distress costs; UND = Underinvestment; TAX = Tax benefits; MNG = Managerial risk aversion; SUB = Hedging substitutes; 
EXP = Risk exposure; EOS = Economies of scale. 
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Table 10. No. of significant results (<0.05): Methodological heterogeneity 
 Panel A: Decision to hedge Panel B: Extent of hedging Panel C: Full sample 





Single industry + [3/13] 23% + [5/10] 50% + [8/23] 35% 
Hedging variable       
Op. hedging included – [5/12] 42%   – [5/12] 42% 
Risk reduction only +/– [4/13] 31% + [3/12] 25% + [7/25] 28% 
Alt. hedging measure   + [5/14] 36% + [5/14] 36% 
Foreign exchange risk – [5/14] 36% – [5/10] 50% – [10/24] 42% 
Interest rate risk – [4/14] 29% + [7/13] 54% + [11/27] 41% 
Commodity risk + [4/13] 31% + [5/10] 50% + [9/23] 39% 
Data characteristics       
Ex ante exposure – [1/14] 7% + [5/14] 36% + [6/28] 21% 
Avg. year + [7/11] 64%   + [2/7] 29% + [9/18] 50% 
Panel data – [4/14] 29%   – [3/7] 43% – [7/21] 33% 
Data from survey – [7/14] 50% + [4/11] 36% – [11/25] 44% 
Estimation characteristics       
Fixed effects +/– [6/13] 46%  + [1/6] 17% + [7/19] 37% 
Endogeneity + [2/12] 17% +/– [4/10] 40% + [6/22] 27% 
Logit – [5/12] 42%   – [5/12] 42% 
Cragg   + [5/13] 38% + [5/13] 38% 
Specification characteristics       
Control EXP   – [2/7] 29% + [5/12] 42% + [7/19] 37% 
Control ASI + [6/14] 43% – [5/13] 38% + [11/27] 41% 
Control MAV – [7/11] 64% + [6/12] 50% – [13/23] 57% 
Control OFH + [3/10] 30% + [5/13] 38% + [8/23] 35% 
Control GDF – [2/11] 18% – [5/10] 50% – [7/21] 33% 
Publication characteristics       
Top journal + [6/11] 55% – [6/8] 75% – [12/19] 63% 
Notes: This table summarizes the results for the methodological differences reported in Tab. 7 and 8. Results of the single hedging 
determinants are aggregated for each moderator variable defined in Tab. 2. The first digit in brackets represents the number of 
significant effects (at least at the 5% level) from the augmented MRA results. The second digit in brackets is the total number of 
hedging determinants with results reported in the augmented MRA. The sign shown before brackets refers to the dominating sign 
of the effect on the decision to hedge (Panel A) and the extent of hedging (Panel B). Signs of the MRA results from Tab. 7 and 8 
are counted as positive (negative) if the coefficient is identical (the opposite) to the predicted sign of the hedging determinant. A 
positive (negative) dominating sign indicates that this moderator has a positive (negative) overall impact on the decision to hedge 
(Panel A) and the extend of hedging (Panel B).  
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